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NO TIME TO WASTE: CAN A STATE PREVENT NUCLEAR
WASTE TRANSPORTATION WITHIN ITS BORDERS ONCE
YUCCA MOUNTAIN BECOMES OPERATIONAL?
RYAN FRANKLIN*
BACKGROUND
Following the drop of the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima on
August 6th, 1945, the United States seriously began contemplating the use
of atomic energy not just as a weapon, but as an efficient energy source.1
President Eisenhower delivered his “Atoms for Peace” speech in front of the
United Nations eight years later, effectively launching a massive American
campaign to build numerous nuclear power plants to generate enough
clean energy to power the entire nation.2 As these plants were being con-
structed, however, policymakers and lawmakers who were champions of
this endeavor failed to consider the problem of nuclear waste generated
by these plants. Unlike fossil fuel burning plants, where particulates are
emitted into the air following combustion,3 burning uranium produces
numerous volatile isotopes that are released into a retention pool within
the confines of a nuclear plant.4
* Ryan Franklin is a third-year student at William & Mary Law School who will earn his
JD degree with an environmental law concentration in May 2021. The author would
primarily like to thank Dr. James E. Strick, one of his most inspirational professors at
Franklin & Marshall College, for introducing him to the monumental challenges of
nuclear waste storage when he taught his Nuclear Weapons, Power, and Waste Disposal
course during the fall semester of 2017. The author would also like to thank his family
for their continual support as he prepared this Note for publication and his ELPR
colleagues for verifying that all the sources incorporated in this Note were properly cited.
1 See AP Was There: US Drops Atomic Bombs on Japan in 1945, ASSOCIATEDPRESS (Aug. 3,
2015), https://apnews.com/3fd267ba7b3c40479382189c99172d61 [https://perma.cc/Y9CP
-PL37] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
2 See Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace” (Dec. 8, 1953),UNIV. OF MD.:U.S.ORATORY
PROJECT, https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/eisenhower-atoms-for-peace-speech-text/
[https://perma.cc/QCD4-6R8P] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
3 See Jay Apt, The Other Reason to Shift away from Coal: Air Pollution That Kills Thousands
Every Year, SCI.AM. (June 7, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-other
-reason-to-shift-away-from-coal-air-pollution-that-kills-thousands-every-year/ [https://perma
.cc/XKL6-2ZDF].
4 See Spent Fuel Pools, U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent
-fuel-storage/pools.html [https://perma.cc/9P55-6CP3] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
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Although some of these isotopes can be recycled to produce more
energy, a majority of these highly radioactive particles are eventually re-
moved from the pool and stored in concrete casks on the grounds of the
nuclear plant where they were produced.5 The half-lives of these isotopes,
like uranium-235 and uranium-238, range from 700 million to four billion
years.6 Despite these alarming statistics, none of the leading technicians
or scientists running the “Atoms for Peace” campaign developed a com-
prehensive plan to contain nuclear waste for millions of years. Only follow-
ing the partial nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1979, did the
scientific community and prominent lawmakers start to seriously assess
long-term challenges associated with nuclear waste storage.7
THESIS
This Note will examine two legal challenges to Virginia that could
arise once Yucca Mountain has been finalized as the permanent, high-
level nuclear waste repository for the United States.8 Regardless of the
mode of ground transportation, high-level nuclear waste produced at
Surry and Santa Anna will travel through the city limits of Richmond
and cross the Blue Ridge Mountains into West Virginia based on current
federal guidelines. The legal challenges would either be initiated by the
United States in response to the Governor of Virginia declaring a state-
wide emergency or initiated by Virginia in response to a finalized pro-
mulgation of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (“NWPA”). In either scenario,
the first legal challenge would assess whether federal law preempted
Virginia law and the second challenge would evaluate whether Virginia’s
police power to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and morals of
its residents would substantially interfere with the U.S. Constitution’s
Commerce Clause. The Court would likely rule that federal laws, like the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (“AEA”) and NWPA, would not preempt the
5 See Dry Cask Storage, U.S.NUCLEARREGUL.COMM’N, https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel
-storage/dry-cask-storage.html [https://perma.cc/UV45-2KE9] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
6 See Radioisotope Brief: Uranium, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/nceh/radiation/emergencies/isotopes/uranium.htm [https://perma.cc/GMT6
-QR4H] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
7 See Three Mile Island Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (Jan. 2012), https://world-nu
clear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/three-mile-island-acci
dent.aspx [https://perma.cc/J7M5-UVBX].
8 If another state, like Virginia, ordered that all high-level nuclear waste transportation
within its borders was prohibited, a federal court would likely evaluate the same legal
challenges in a similar manner as this Note proposes.
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Virginia Emergency Services and Disaster Law of 2000 (“Emergency Law”).
However, the Court would likely strike down Virginia’s attempt to prevent
the transportation of high-level radioactive waste within its borders due
to preemption by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (“HMTA”)
and Dormant Commerce Clause violations.
Part I will discuss the history of how Yucca Mountain became desig-
nated as the only permanent repository for high-level radioactive waste.
Part II will explore the main dispute over the legal authority of
the Governor of Virginia to ban the transportation of nuclear waste within
Virginia by an emergency declaration.
Section A will analyze whether a state of emergency declaration
in Virginia would be superseded by any federal law concerning nuclear
waste, such as the AEA, NWPA, and HMTA.
Section B will analyze whether a Virginia state of emergency
declaration would withstand the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, assuming there was no federal preemption.
The Conclusion will overview all the legal disputes that could arise
of the Virginia Governor’s emergency declaration and reflect upon the
current state of nuclear waste in the United States.
I. HISTORY OF YUCCA MOUNTAIN
The first serious discussion surrounding permanent storage of
highly radioactive nuclear waste began in 1955, when the Atomic Energy
Commission (“AEC”)9 requested that the National Resource Council of
the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) conduct a study evaluating
long-term options for storing spent nuclear waste within the borders of
the United States.10 The NAS Committee on Waste Disposal published
its findings in 1957.11 The report noted that the committee was tasked
with “assembling the existing geologic information pertinent to disposal,
delineating the unanswered problems associated with the disposal schemes
proposed, and point[ing] out areas of research and development meriting
first attention[.]”12 This committee concluded that the most viable solu-
tion to storing high-level radioactive waste would be insulating it in salt
9 The AEC was replaced by the current Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in 1974.
10 Frank D. Hansen & Christi D. Leigh, SANDIA NAT’L LAB’YS, SALT DISPOSAL OF HEAT-
GENERATING NUCLEAR WASTE 2 (2011).
11 See id. at 2–3.
12 NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., REPORT ON DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE ON LAND 1 (1957).
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domes or salt bed cavities.13 Following this report, the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory conducted numerous field tests to study the viability of storing
radioactive waste in salt deposits.14 Moreover, the AEC in 1970 launched
a field demonstration in Lyons, Kansas, to determine if the deposition of
spent nuclear waste in a bedded salt mine repository could be a successful
long-term strategy adopted by the federal government.15 A few months after
this demonstration, the NAS Committee on Radioactive Waste Manage-
ment reaffirmed the 1957 report findings by determining that depositing
high-level nuclear waste in bedded salt mines was the safest option for
storing nuclear waste.16
During the 1970s, the AEC and Energy Research Development
Administration17 began searching for deep salt beds throughout the conti-
nental United States that could serve as long-term repositories for high-
level radioactive waste.18 The types of sites explored included salt domes,
volcanic tuffs, salt formations, and basalt formations.19 While these
geological disposal sites were being surveyed, the United States was also
considering other methods for disposal of high-level radioactive waste.20
The alternatives most seriously considered included shipping waste to
space, transmutation, disposal in ice sheets, storage in dry casks, and dis-
posal in deep seabeds.21 After the EPA evaluated all of these options in
1980, including geologic repositories, it determined in an environmental
impact statement (“EIS”) that the Department of Energy’s (“DOE”) “devel-
opment of a programmatic strategy favoring the disposal of commercially
generated radioactive wastes in deep geologic repositories . . . is war-
ranted.”22 The EPA reasoned that although alternatives to geologic
13 See id.
14 NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI.,REPORT ON DISPOSAL OF SOLIDRADIOACTIVEWASTES IN BEDDED
SALT DEPOSITS 1 (1970).
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 The Energy Research and Development Administration was replaced by the Department
of Energy in 1977.
18 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
ENERGY 20 (2012).
19 See id.
20 See SEC’Y OF ENERGY,RECOMMENDATION BY THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY REGARDING THE
SUITABILITY OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE FOR A REPOSITORY UNDER THE NUCLEAR
WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1982 3 (2002).
21 See id.
22 DEP’T OF ENERGY, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: MANAGEMENT OF COM-
MERCIALLY GENERATEDRADIOACTIVE WASTE 1.31 (1980) [hereinafter FINALENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT].
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repositories would have similar long-term environmental impacts, evidence
suggested that these alternatives would very likely not surpass the technol-
ogy needed to support long-term storage of high-level radioactive waste.23
After deeply considering the public safety impacts of high-level
radioactive waste following the Three Mile Island incident, Congress
passed the NWPA in 1982 to create a schedule for the construction of a
permanent nuclear waste repository.24 After winding down the list of po-
tential geologic repositories, Congress enacted a 1987 amendment to the
NWPA designating Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the only site under
consideration as a permanent high-level nuclear waste repository for the
United States.25 Fifteen years later, in 2002, President George W. Bush
approved the DOE’s selection of Yucca Mountain as the nation’s perma-
nent repository for storing high-level nuclear waste.26 However, Yucca
Mountain has been plagued with numerous difficulties as Nevada contin-
ues to vehemently oppose the 1987 Amendment,27 and President Barack
Obama cut all funding for the Yucca Mountain repository in 2009.28
Although Yucca Mountain remained inactive for nearly a decade,
President Donald J. Trump allocated $120 million in his 2018 White House
budget to restart the process of making Yucca Mountain an active nuclear
waste repository.29 Currently, it is still uncertain whether Yucca Moun-
tain will begin accepting high-level nuclear waste within the next decade
given Nevada’s strong opposition, Congressional inaction, and safety con-
cerns surrounding nuclear waste transportation.30 However, there is strong
consensus among members of the scientific community that current on-site
storage methods for high-level radioactive waste are an unsustainable
23 See id.
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2012).
25 42 U.S.C. § 10172 (1987).
26 H.J. Res. 87 (July 23, 2002).
27 See NEV. COMM’N ON NUCLEAR PROJECTS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
NEVADA COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR PROJECTS 65 (2019).
28 See Ben Geman & Katie Howell, Department of Energy Favors Renewables, Cuts Yucca
Mountain, SCI. AM. (May 7, 2009), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/doe-cuts
-yucca/ [https://perma.cc/K58E-JERS].
29 See Ken Silverstein, Trump Administration Would Resurrect Yucca Mountain and
Nuclear Energy, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein
/2017/03/16/trump-administration-would-resurrect-yucca-mountain-and-nuclear-en
ergy/#44e7ee4658b5 [https://perma.cc/BYW9-4JFT].
30 See Rod Ewing & David Klaus, Life After Yucca Mountain: The Time Has Come to Reset
US Nuclear Waste Policy, THEHILL (Dec. 9, 2019), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog
/energy-environment/473627-life-after-yucca-mountain-the-time-has-come-to-reset
[https://perma.cc/FU2X-FMHW].
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solution for nuclear waste storage.31 President Obama’s Blue Ribbon Com-
mission on America’s Nuclear Future, in a 2012 report to the Secretary
of Energy, stated that the “conclusion that disposal is needed and that deep
geologic disposal is the scientifically preferred approach has been reached
by every expert panel that has looked at the issue and by every other
country that is pursuing a nuclear waste management program.”32 Since
many nuclear plants in the United States are reaching their storage
capacity for high-level radioactive waste, and sea-level rise continues to
threaten the security of exposed dry casks, this waste must be trans-
ported to a geologic repository in the near future before disaster strikes.33
Although Yucca Mountain is one of the most controversial topics in the
energy field plaguing scientists and lawmakers, this Note assumes that
Yucca Mountain has received Congressional and Presidential approval
to begin operating as a repository.34
II. LEGAL DISPUTE (U.S. CONSTITUTION)
Once Congress passes a law that initiates nationwide transporta-
tion of high-level nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain, Virginia must over-
see the safe and secure transfer of waste through Richmond and the Blue
Ridge Mountains.35 The quickest solution to prevent the transportation
of nuclear waste under existing state law would be an executive order by
the Governor of Virginia declaring a statewide emergency through the
Emergency Law.36 The Governor of Virginia would justify this emergency
declaration by a General Assembly finding that the transportation of high-
level radioactive waste in canisters opens the possibility of “disasters of
unprecedented size and destructiveness resulting from . . . sabotage.”37 The
Philadelphia Inquirer’s discovery in 1983 that a canister with “radioactive
material” was lost for twelve hours after falling off a truck is only one
31 See FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 22, at 1.31; BLUE RIBBON
COMM’N ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 18, at 27.
32 See BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 18, at 27.
33 See generally Despite Closures, U.S. Nuclear Electricity Generation in 2018 Surpassed
Its Previous Peak, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php
?id=38792 [https://perma.cc/65ET-JQNU] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
34 See Jason Garcia, Nukes in Our Back Yards, ORLANDOSENTINEL, https://www.orlandosen
tinel.com/news/os-xpm-2002-07-09-0207090250-story.html [https://perma.cc/FA8G-A8CM].
35 See Radioactive Waste, VA. DEP’T HEALTH, http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/radiological
-health/radiological-health/radioactive-waste/ [https://perma.cc/9W96-XYH5] (last visited
Mar. 10, 2021).
36 See VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.17 (2008).
37 Id. § 44-146.14 (2000).
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material fact that could support such a finding.38 The Governor of Virginia
would also allege in his executive order that national security threats, like
the misplacing of these canisters, would pose insurmountable public wel-
fare risks.39 Since this emergency declaration would halt the transportation
of all high-level nuclear waste within Virginia, this would potentially
inhibit the goal of Congress in passing the NWPA. Moreover, it is likely
that the United States would respond by requesting a permanent injunc-
tion to block the Governor’s executive order from being implemented
because it violates the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy and Commerce
clauses.40 Federal lawyers would argue that any state law attempting to
prevent nuclear waste transportation may be permissible if it is neither
preempted by the Commerce nor Supremacy clauses of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.41 Additionally, these attorneys would also argue that state laws are
deemed valid unless the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” was to
preempt the authority of the state.42 A federal court with original jurisdic-
tion would likely evaluate this preemption claim by following this stan-
dard: “If Congress has expressed an unambiguous intention to preempt
states from banning the transportation of nuclear waste, any state action
in this area is invalid.”43 It is imperative to first analyze the three federal
laws that could potentially preempt the Code of Virginia: the AEA, NWPA,
an HMTA.
A. Preemption
1. Atomic Energy Act
The main purpose of the AEA is to encourage the safe develop-
ment of nuclear power.44 Although Congress passed an Amendment in
38 Mike Mobley, who worked at the Tennessee Department of Health and Environment,
stated that if someone picked up the cask, “it would be a very serious danger.” Radioactive
Canister Found, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 25, 1983, at 8A, col. 1.
39 See id.
40 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952).
41 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . .
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States[.]”).
42 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 311 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
43 Christopher F. Baum, Banning the Transportation of Nuclear Waste: A Permissible
Exercise of the State’s Police Power, 52 FORDHAM. L. REV. 663, 668 (1984).
44 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461
U.S. 190, 220 (1983).
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1959 to attempt to define the role of states with this law, it still did not
explicitly declare that the federal government has the exclusive authority
to regulate radiation-related safety hazards.45 This leaves open the
possibility that states may regulate these hazards.46 The Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (“NRC”) has the authority to regulate the disposal of
nuclear waste under the AEA.47 However, there is no express provision
in the AEA that forces the NRC to mandate the transportation methods
for nuclear waste.48 Since no federal law requires nuclear waste deliver-
ies, “a state . . . [law] forbidding the transport of the waste does not force
the possessor of nuclear waste into a physically impossible situation.”49
The Court still has not resolved whether the AEA prevents states
from regulating nuclear waste transportation.50 Although the Court
explicitly stated that field preemption relating to nuclear safety would
override any state law discussing the same subject, it also left open the
possibility that states may have the authority to pass laws relating to nu-
clear safety.51 The Court still has yet to determine the meaning behind the
AEA’s ambiguous language related to preemption. In Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., the Court recognized that the NRC has exclusive authority
to operate and construct nuclear plants, and the federal government occu-
pies the entire field of nuclear safety.52 However, the Court did not strike
down a state regulation of punitive damages, which appears to be a direct
contradiction of its prior statement that nuclear safety is completely occu-
pied by the federal government.53 Although this holding was overruled by
statute,54 the Silkwood Court’s discussion of state law tort remedies in
the context of the field preemption illustrates that uncertainty over which
authority can regulate nuclear safety still persists.
45 See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir. 1971).
46 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2012 (1992) (excluding any reference to states from a plain reading
of the statute).
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (2005).
48 See Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 583 (7th Cir. 1982).
49 Baum, supra note 43, at 670.
50 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
161, 212 (1981) (“[T]he federal government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety
concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the states.”).
51 See id.
52 See 464 U.S. 238, 249 (1984).
53 See id. at 271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s) (2006) (“No court may award punitive damages in any action
with respect to a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation against a person on behalf
of whom the United States is obligated to make payments under an agreement of in-
demnification covering such incident or evacuation.”).
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Section 2021(g) of the AEA suggests that a state and the NRC must
cooperate before that state enters an agreement to assume independent
regulatory duties within the NRC’s authority, but Section 2021(k) implies
that the NRC occupies the entire field of nuclear safety.55 These conflicting
provisions, therefore, suggest “congressional confusion as to the intended
extent of the federal preemption.”56 Additionally, the legislative history
of the 1959 AEA Amendment indicates that the federal government has
the exclusive authority to regulate only technical issues.57 Christopher
F. Baum, in his 1984 note titled Banning the Transportation of Nuclear
Waste: A Permissible Exercise of the States’ Police Power, suggested that
“a non-discriminatory, total ban of all . . . shipments of nuclear waste,
which by its nature requires no technical expertise, avoids preemption
by the AEA.”58 It is important to briefly evaluate this assertion.
A total ban on nuclear waste transportation in a state through a
codified emergency declaration would very likely not force other state
carriers to modify their safety measures.59 Although Congress enacted
the AEA to promote nuclear power use, this goal does not have to be
achieved “at all costs.”60 States can prevent the construction of nuclear
plants by asserting their authority through severe land use requirements
or under the Clean Air Act.61 Moreover, the Court in 1983 concluded that
a State may enact a moratorium on nuclear plant assembly through an
economic justification.62
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
& Development Commission, the Court assessed whether the AEA pre-
empted California’s 1976 amendment to the Warren-Alquist Act, which
halted all nuclear plant production in the state until California’s State En-
ergy Resources Conservation and Development Commission determined
55 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2021(g) (2005) (States and the NRC must cooperate to “assure
that State and Commission programs for protection against hazards of radiation will be
coordinated and compatible.”) with 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (2005) (“Nothing in this section
shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities
for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.”).
56 Baum, supra note 43, at 675.
57 See id. at 676.
58 Id. at 677.
59 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960) (holding a municipal
ordinance for smoke that required structural modifications in federally licensed ships would
not interrupt national uniformity since it did not conflict with other municipal ordinances).
60 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
161, 200 (1981).
61 See In re Consolidated Edison Co., 7 N.R.C. 31, 34 (1978); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7416, 7422 (1977).
62 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 208.
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there was a sustainable method to store high-level nuclear waste.63 The
Court first discussed that limited nuclear waste storage capacity at
reactor sites is a serious concern that could force the closure of numerous
nuclear plants.64 Additionally, the Court explained that the lack of a
permanent nuclear waste repository has rendered the American nuclear
energy market indecisive.65 The Court then emphasized that the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Warren-Alquist Act was not pre-
empted by the AEA because California had the authority to regulate
nuclear plants “for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards.”66 Most importantly, the Court’s standard for evaluating the
AEA preemption claim began “with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the states were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”67
After discussing the history of the AEC, the Court reasoned that
this commission did not have authority under the AEA to regulate elec-
tricity production or economic concerns.68 More specifically, the Court held
that Congress permitted the federal government, through the NRC,69 to
occupy only the field of safety and public health related to nuclear power
plants.70 The Court reviewed the legislative history accompanying the
passage of the AEA and affirmed the state’s exclusive authority to regu-
late electricity production from nuclear plants.71 In summary, the Court
held that “Congress has preserved the dual regulation of nuclear-pow-
ered electricity generation: the Federal Government maintains complete
control of the safety and ‘nuclear’ aspects of energy production; the states
exercise their traditional authority over the need for additional generat-
ing capacity, the type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use,
ratemaking, and the like.”72
Once this legal principle was articulated, the Court focused on the
rationale underlying California’s moratorium on nuclear plant production.73
The Court began evaluating California’s law by asserting that a state
63 See id. at 194.
64 See id. at 195.
65 See id. at 196–97.
66 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (2005).
67 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 311 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
68 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 207.
69 Id. (“The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) . . . exercises the AEC’s regulatory
authority[.]”).
70 See id.
71 See id. at 208.
72 Id. at 211–12.
73 See id. at 212.
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moratorium on nuclear plant production based on safety concerns would
directly conflict with the AEA and therefore be preempted.74 Moreover,
a determination from California’s State Energy Resources Conservation
and Development Commission that nuclear power is too unsafe for de-
velopment would also be preempted because it explicitly conflicts with
the chief objective of the AEA.75 The California Assembly Committee on
Resources, Land Use, and Energy, in justifying the moratorium, argued
that the failure of the United States government to develop a permanent
nuclear waste repository could result in the shutdown of many reactors
since it is very expensive to oversee nuclear waste storage at nuclear plant
facilities.76 The Court indicated that even though it is a difficult task to
ascertain legislative intent,77 California’s economic rationale for passing
the California Public Resources Code Section 25524.2 was accepted.78
Lastly, the Court evaluated whether California’s law directly im-
peded the purpose of the AEA.79 The Court first stated that the California
law would be preempted if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”80 The
Court then articulated that the main purpose of the AEA is to promote
the production of nuclear power.81 Furthermore, the Court asserted that
the Price-Anderson Act, which complemented the AEA, was designed to
encourage atomic energy development.82 Although California’s law
appeared to impede nuclear energy production in direct violation of the
AEA, the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that
promoting nuclear power should not be achieved “at all costs.”83 The
Court concluded that under the existing language of the AEA, states are
given authority to stall or prevent nuclear power production.84 Since the
disputed language in the AEA has not materially changed since this
decision in 1983, the Court’s interpretation of Section 2021(g)–(k) of the
AEA is still the law of the land.85 The Court recently applied the central
74 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 213.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 213–14.
77 See id. at 216.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 220.
80 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
81 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 221.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 222 (internal quotations omitted).
84 See id. at 223.
85 See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(g)–(k) (1992).
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Pacific Gas & Electric Co. holdings to an issue involving a Virginia mora-
torium on uranium mining.86 Incorporating the Court’s discussion on
interpreting legislative intent in this case is vital to determining if the
Emergency Law is preempted by the AEA.
In Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, a Virginia company argued
that Virginia’s law prohibiting the mining of uranium within the state’s
borders was preempted by the AEA.87 In evaluating the rationale under-
lying Pacific Gas & Electric Co., the Court first stated that preempting
a state law is “a serious intrusion into state sovereignty.”88 The Court
cautioned that inquiring into an unclear Congressional mandate could
severely infringe upon Virginia’s sovereignty.89 Additionally, the Court
questioned whether using legislative intent to help interpret statutes
involving field preemption claims is appropriate.90 By invoking Pacific
Gas & Electric Co., Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, and Kavanaugh stated that
“trying to peer inside legislators’ skulls is too fraught an enterprise” and
therefore they refused to derive the legislative purpose behind Virginia’s
uranium moratorium law.91 It is unclear after Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
whether a state may prohibit nuclear waste transportation by citing
economic or noneconomic concerns.92 However, it appears that states may
use economic justifications as a pretext for safety regulations pertaining
to nuclear waste transportation.93
The threat of nuclear waste casks spilling on railways passing
through Richmond encompasses health and economic concerns for Virginia.
Therefore, if the Governor of Virginia does invoke the Emergency Law to
ban the shipment of all high-level nuclear waste by making a creative
economic argument, this action will likely not be preempted by the AEA.
Because the Virginia Governor’s emergency declaration is likely not in
conflict with the AEA, it is vital to evaluate whether the NWPA would
preempt this executive order.
86 Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1900 (2019).
87 Id.




91 Id. at 1907.
92 See Steven H. Goldberg, State Power and Preemption in the Nuclear Energy Field: Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission
{103 S. Ct. 1713}, 26 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 139, 154 (1984).
93 See id.
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2. Nuclear Waste Policy Act
The NWPA was designed to create nuclear waste disposal sites in
response to growing nuclear waste across the United States.94 The NWPA
explicitly states that it should not interfere with any local or state law
“pertaining to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioac-
tive waste.”95 Under the NWPA, a state may prevent the construction of
a nuclear waste disposal site within its borders if it submits a notice of
disapproval to Congress.96 Since the Emergency Law could be implemented
by the Virginia Governor enacting a statewide ban of all high-level nuclear
waste transportation within Virginia’s borders, this would fall squarely
within the statutory language of the NWPA, and therefore the Virginia
law would not be preempted. Since highly radiated waste falls within the
scope of the HMTA, a preemption analysis under this law is also required
to determine if the Governor of Virginia may ban high-level nuclear
waste transportation.
3. Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
The HMTA explicitly commands that a state regulation will not
be preempted if (1) it does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce
and (2) the level or protection is at least equal to protection from federal
requirements.97 The second prong of the test is likely satisfied since the
risks of not moving nuclear waste are at least equal to the risks posed by
transporting high-level nuclear waste.98 The first prong, however, requires
a balancing test between the Emergency Law and the U.S. Constitution’s
Commerce Clause. If this Virginia law is deemed unreasonably burdensome
on interstate commerce, it would be preempted by the HMTA.99 Evaluating
this prong is very likely equivalent to assessing whether the law violates
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution.100
94 See Baum, supra note 43, at 681.
95 42 U.S.C. § 10108 (1983).
96 See 42 U.S.C. § 10136(b) (1987); 42 U.S.C. § 10135 (1983) (stating a site will be disap-
proved unless Congress passes a joint resolution within 90 days of an uninterrupted
session approving it).
97 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5127 (2005).
98 See Nuclear Power Plant Security and Access Control, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST. (Sept.
2016), https://www.nei.org/resources/fact-sheets/nuclear-plant-security-and-access-control
[https://perma.cc/CW6V-68SD].
99 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 311 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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B. Commerce Clause
On its face, the Emergency Law would likely appear not to violate
the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause because it was created to allow
Virginia to quickly respond to imminent local emergencies for a temporary
period, and nuclear waste transportation is not “economic in nature.”101
Exercising this vast power in the wake of a federal plan, codified under
the NWPA, to move nuclear waste from Santa Anna and Surry to Yucca
Mountain would likely not interfere with Congress’s ability to control
interstate commerce. However, Virginia’s decision to completely ban ship-
ping high-level nuclear waste within the state, under its emergency dec-
laration law, would likely violate the Dormant Commerce Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.
The major premise of the Dormant Commerce Clause is that a state
may not pass a law that hinders Congress’s ability to regulate interstate
commerce.102 In dormant commerce cases, a federal court must draw a
line between an impermissible and permissible burden on interstate com-
merce.103 Federal courts have usually deferred to states if the state law
was designed to protect public safety on state highways.104 For instance,
a state law that banned the transportation of out-of-state nuclear waste
within its borders but permitted intrastate transportation of that waste
would be unconstitutional.105 The factors a court would consider when
determining the legitimacy of a state’s public safety argument would in-
clude “the specific facts, such as the population density, terrain and road
conditions of each state.”106 Furthermore, a state law banning nuclear
waste transportation would be “checked politically” by the “economic pres-
sures” of likely losing nuclear power as an energy source.107 The Court,
if it evaluated a state’s public safety argument in a Dormant Commerce
Clause challenge, could mandate an alternative to a state’s complete ban
101 U.S. v. Morrison, 539 U.S. 598, 613, 658 (2000).
102 City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1978) (“But whatever New Jersey’s
ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of com-
merce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin,
to treat them differently.”).
103 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
104 See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 459 U.S. 520, 523 (1959). But see Kassel v. Consol.
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (“[T]he incantation of a purpose to promote
the public health or safety does not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause attack.”).
105 See Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 631 (9th
Cir. 1982).
106 Baum, supra note 43, at 685.
107 See id. at 687.
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of nuclear waste transportation on highways.108 In the context of this Note,
an alternative could be another path of the nuclear waste that would
avoid Richmond.109 However, there would likely not be a feasible alterna-
tive,110 since all the major highways and railways run through the city.111
An alternative plan to move high-level nuclear waste on state
highways or county roads would greatly increase the risks associated with
a radioactive leak since immobile trucks with canisters could be easy tar-
gets for terrorists, and these vehicles are more likely to get in accidents
while navigating more difficult roadways than railroads, which are widely
regarded as the safest transportation method for dangerous materials.112
If there were no alternative means to transport high-level nuclear waste
outside the Richmond metropolitan area, the Court would have to decide
the case by weighing the Pike factors.113
In Pike v. Bruce Church, the Court established a balancing test that
all federal judges must implement when evaluating if a local regulation
or law infringes the Dormant Commerce Clause.114 Most importantly, the
Court stated that “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effec-
tuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate com-
merce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits.”115 Although this standard is informative in theory, its application
in practice has not resulted in any binding guidelines for lower federal
courts to follow. For example, the Court’s plurality decision in Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., which drew upon the Pike factors, reveals
108 See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (A local statute violates
interstate commerce if “reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve
legitimate local interests, are available.”).
109 See Representative Transportation Routes to Yucca Mountain and Transportation
Impacts (Cask Shipments by State) (illustration), https://www.yuccamountain.org/image
/ymroutes15.png [https://perma.cc/444V-8XCH] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
110 Flying nuclear waste is the most dangerous alternative, and therefore it would not be
feasible.
111 See Todd’s Railfan Guide to Richmond VA—Downtown (illustration), https://www.rail
fanguides.us/va/richmond/map1/index.htm [https://perma.cc/5SZJ-EWP7] (last visited
Mar. 10, 2021).
112 See Michael F. McBride, Railroad Transportation of Nuclear Waste and Other Hazardous
Materials, 21 ELEC. J. 55, 56 (2008).
113 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved,
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”).
114 See id.
115 Id.
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that weighing the nature of a local interest against its impact on interstate
commerce is strictly fact-specific.116
Precedent from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has demon-
strated that a state law banning the importation of nuclear waste into its
borders would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause since it is discrimina-
tory.117 The Court made clear in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey that a
state’s objective “may not be accomplished by discriminating against
articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some
reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”118 Therefore,
the Emergency Law must prohibit the movement of all high-level nuclear
waste within its borders to withstand being struck down based on dis-
crimination. However, Virginia’s creative economic argument justifying
the state’s emergency declaration likely must be more than illusory.119 To
withstand a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, therefore, Virginia
must convince the Court that a nuclear waste spill on a railroad, which
is highly likely, will result in a major economic impact to win its case.
However, numerous government studies in the past few decades have
demonstrated that nuclear waste transport by rail would be an extremely
safe mode of transportation.120
Virginia’s best case to convince the Court that the threat of a radio-
logical accident is severe enough to warrant a statewide ban on high-level
nuclear waste transportation would involve relying upon Nevada’s most
recent recommendations to their legislature and Governor.121 According
to this report, at least one loaded cask with high-level nuclear waste would
travel to Yucca Mountain for roughly fifty decades once the NWPA was
fully implemented.122 This high-level nuclear waste, or spent nuclear fuel
from reactors across the country, consists of “four radiological impacts”
to the public.123 These risks include “routine radiation doses to members
of the public; routine radiation doses to transportation workers; potential
release of radioactive material following a severe accident; and potential
release of radioactive material following a terrorist attack . . . .”124 However,
116 450 U.S. 662, 670–71 (1981).
117 See Ill. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 213–14 (7th Cir. 1982).
118 437 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1978).
119 See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 671 (plurality opinion).
120 See U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N., Safety of Spent Nuclear Fuel Transp., 7, 9 (2017),
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1703/ML17038A460.pdf [https://perma.cc/873H-LNFH].
121 See NEV. COMM’N ON NUCLEAR PROJECTS, supra note 27, at 65.
122 See id. at 45–46.
123 See id. at 46–47.
124 See id.
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the DOE determined that the likelihood of these radiological risks com-
ing to fruition was low when it published its supplemental EIS in 2008.125
In its EIS, the DOE stated that routine radiation exposure from
workers and the public would be insignificant or minute.126 The EIS then
stated that a transportation accident in an urban setting could result in
recovery costs ranging from $300,000 to $10 billion.127 Additionally, clean-
up costs from a terrorist attack on a cask filled with highly radioactive
nuclear waste in a densely populated center could reach $10 billion.128
Finally, the NRC approved the EIS almost in its entirety in 2008, relying
upon widely confirmed radiological health evaluations and transporta-
tion inferences.129 In response, Nevada and other parties challenged the
NRC’s subsequent approval of the EIS.130
In 2008, Nevada specifically alleged, based on their own findings,
that a transportation accident in an urban area could cost nearly $190
billion in damages.131 Additionally, Nevada determined that a terrorist
attack on a high-level nuclear shipment in a metropolitan area could
require clean-up costs ranging from $3.5–648 billion.132 Although Nevada
is willing to challenge the EIS radiological assumptions once NRC licens-
ing procedures resume, the NRC currently asserts that the clean-up costs
for high-level nuclear waste spills following transportation accidents are
low.133 The NRC’s spent nuclear fuel transportation fact sheet reaffirms
the very low probability that high-level radioactive waste will be exposed
to the public following a nuclear accident involving shipping containers.134
In one of the opening pages of the document, the NRC directly asks
the three questions pertinent to a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge,
125 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENV’T IMPACT STATEMENT FOR A GEOLOGIC
REPOSITORY FOR THE DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NYE COUNTY, NEV., 4-72, 5-32-33, 6-4,6-11, 6-15 (2008).
126 See id. at 3-99, 4-65, 4-67.
127 Robert M. Halstead, Transp. Advisor, State of Nevada’s Agency for Nuclear Projects,
Testimony at U.S. House of Rep. Comm. On Transp. & Infrastructure (Apr. 25, 2002).
128 See id.
129 NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF’S ADOPTION
DETERMINATION REPORT FOR THE U.S.DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’SENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENTS FOR THE PROPOSED GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN U.S. 3–15
(2008).
130 See NEV. COMM’N ON NUCLEAR PROJECTS, supra note 27, at 47.
131 See State of Nevada’s Petition to Intervene as A Full Party at 1055 (No. 63-001) (Dec.
2008), http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/licensing/Contentions_NV.pdf [https://perma.cc
/34K7-T876].
132 See id. at 1086.
133 See NEV. COMM’N ON NUCLEAR PROJECTS, supra note 27, at 47.
134 U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, supra note 120, at 8.
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including the health risks and likelihood of a transportation accident.135
In its initial response, the NRC assures the public that nuclear waste has
been safely transported throughout the United States for more than four
decades.136 The NRC then proceeds to state that every cask, lined with
steel walls five to fifteen inches thick, is certified only after it passes four
stringent tests.137 The NRC admits that although there have been four
accidents out of the approximately 1,300 nuclear waste shipments in the
last thirty-five years, none of the accidents resulted in radiation expo-
sure.138 In 2014, an NRC final report assessing the risk of nuclear waste
transport determined that “the risk from the radiation emitted from the
casks is a small fraction of naturally occurring background radiation and
the risk from accidental release of radioactive material is several orders of
magnitude less.”139 The NRC then highlighted some of the report’s findings
to emphasize the very low likelihood of radiation exposure to the public
from a transportation accident.140 The commission stated that if an acci-
dent released radioactive materials, the dose would likely not cause instant
harm, and the chances of this type of scenario are one-in-one-billion.141
Finally, the NRC reaffirmed the safety of its casks by hypothesizing that
in a scenario where five out of 10,000 accidents were more severe than
foreseen, they “would not expect a radioactive release in 99.99973% of
those 5 accidents.”142 The NRC concluded by reaffirming that they have
taken stringent measures since 9/11 to ensure that high-level nuclear waste
will be protected from sabotage during transport.143
Returning to the Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry, the Court
would likely decide that Virginia’s economic justification in prohibiting
the transportation of high-level nuclear waste throughout its borders is
illusory because the NRC has credibly determined the extremely low
probability of radiation exposure following a transportation accident.144
Although Nevada has suggested even more grave economic consequences
from a transportation accident than federal standards, the Court will
135 See id. at 2.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 3–4.
138 See id. at 5.
139 U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, SPENT FUEL TRANSP. RISK ASSESSMENT: FINAL REPORT
iii (2014).
140 See id. at 6–7.
141 See id.
142 U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, supra note 120, at 8.
143 See id. at 9.
144 See id. at 8.
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very likely give preferential treatment to the scientific findings derived
from the United States’ premier agency on nuclear safety: the NRC.145
Moreover, the Emergency Law would explicitly hinder the ability of the
federal government to regulate the movement of high-level nuclear waste
and cause a domino effect that other states would follow, effectively
repudiating the main objective of the NWPA.146 Even though Virginia’s
most important government agencies are centered in Richmond, permit-
ting this emergency declaration to take effect would open the floodgates
for other states such as Maryland and New York to prevent nuclear waste
transportation through their capitals by initiating similar statewide emer-
gency declarations.147 The Dormant Commerce Clause was chiefly de-
signed to prevent this “Race to the Bottom[.]”148 Therefore it is very likely
five Justices would hold that the Emergency Law, as applied to a State-
wide ban on nuclear waste transportation, is unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Nuclear waste storage is an immense problem that will continue to
plague the United States, but more importantly the world, for millions of
years.149 The global warming crisis and rise in worldwide terrorist activi-
ties make the security of nuclear waste the number one priority for the
survival of the human race.150 It is this compelling interest that led to the
passage of the NWPA because politicians recognized that there needed to
be a nationwide plan to avoid a major terrorist attack on nuclear waste
sites. However, the federal government expressly required state cooperation
with the implementation of the NWPA, HMTA, and AEA.151 Unless the
Court acknowledges that the legal issue of regulating the transportation
of highly radioactive nuclear waste is a domain solely in the hands of the
145 See NEV. COMM’N ON NUCLEAR PROJECTS, supra note 27, at 47.
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (2012).
147 See generally Government Agencies, VIRGINIA.GOV, https://www.virginia.gov/agencies
[https://perma.cc/MAH2-2SZD] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
148 Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the
-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1213
(1992). See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1978).
149 See Christine Ro, The Staggering Timescales of Nuclear Waste Disposal, FORBES (Nov. 26,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinero/2019/11/26/the-staggering-timescales-of
-nuclear-waste-disposal/?sh=5ba8f8329cf5 [https://perma.cc/P4N4-WYWT].
150 See Richard Benson, From Nuclear War to Rogue AI, the Top 10 Threats Facing Civil-
isation, WIRED (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/10-threats-civilisation-ai
-asteroid-tyrannical-leader [https://perma.cc/JYJ6-4TZL].
151 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10172–10172a (2012).
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federal government, states will likely not be preempted by federal laws or
measures that attempt to regulate this transportation.152 However, it ap-
pears upon further analysis that a state law banning the transport of
highly radioactive nuclear waste within its borders would likely violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution and be preempted by
the HMTA, even if that sovereign officially declared a statewide emergency.
The Race to the Bottom consequence of permitting every State to
declare an emergency once Yucca Mountain becomes operational would
directly undermine the federal objective in creating a national nuclear
waste repository under the NWPA.153 Even though some judges would
decide that the federal government cannot infringe a state’s emergency
declaration in weighing the Pike factors, it is likely that a majority of judges
who would encounter this case in Virginia and other states would rule
that the public’s risk of radiation exposure from a nuclear waste spill is
neither a compelling nor scientifically credible interest given the state of
America’s cask technology.154 Therefore, it is foreseeable that once Yucca
Mountain starts receiving nuclear waste, no state could legally prevent
the transport of highly radioactive waste within its borders.
152 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983) (stating certain aspects of nuclear
safety are delegated to the states).
153 See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626–27.
154 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
